Identification with a social group can operate as a powerful heuristic, allowing an individual to easily make political judgments. But, a person can identify with multiple groups, which may be mobilized toward different political ends. How do opinions and behaviors change when a person's identities are in competition with each other, creating cross-pressures? The Evangelical Immigration Table ( EIT)-a broad coalition of evangelical Christian leaders supporting liberal immigration policies-has been working to mobilize evangelical Christians on immigration; however, many evangelical Christians also hold competing partisan identities that push them to maintain their existing conservative immigration opinions. Using both experimental and panel data, I show that the EIT can influence evangelicals' immigration attitudes; however, these changes in attitudes do not correspond to an increased willingness to act politically in support of reform. Instead, I find the EIT has been more successful at demobilizing evangelical opponents of immigration reform. * Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. E-mail: mmargo@sas.upenn.edu.
Cohesive political blocs are often forged from existing social groups. Group leaderswhether religious figures, union organizers, or community activists-serve as liaisons between social and political worlds, providing voters with cues as to how their identification with a particular group should translate into political preferences and activities. This political activation of social identities can create highly unified political blocs as group members bound together by shared beliefs and outlooks mobilize behind a common political cause (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Miller et al. 1981; Simon and Klandermans 2001) . But, a person can belong to multiple groups and hold multiple identities, which may be mobilized toward different political ends. Although many scholars have explored how a person's identity can shape her political beliefs and actions, less is known about how opinions and behaviors change when someone's identities are in competition with each other, creating strong cross-pressures.
To understand how social identities interact politically, I look at a particular instance in which two identities-political and religious-that frequently operate in concert provide conflicting attitudinal cues. On the one hand, having a partisan identity is akin to being a part of a political team (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) , and partisan identities can operate as "enduring" commitments (Campbell et al. 1960 ) that shape the way partisans view and interpret the world (Bartels 2002) . The research on religious identites' relationship with political attitudes, on the other hand, is also well documented (Campbell et al. 1960; Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Guth et al. 2006) . So how does partisanship compete against another salient social identity that we know matters for political attitudes? The Evangelical Immigration Table offers an opportunity to answer this question.
Since its inception in 2013, the Evangelical Immigration Table ( EIT)-a broad coalition of over 140 evangelical Christian leaders and groups in support of comprehensive immigration reform-has both been urging Congress to pass progressive immigration policies and working to rally evangelical Christians under the banner of immigration reform. The EIT's aim is to activate religious identities to change political attitudes; however, most of the EIT's intended audience also holds a competing partisan identity that pushes them toward a very different set of political opinions. A majority of white evangelical Christians are also Republican and have consistently taken a correspondingly conservative position on immigration policy. The EIT's lofty goal of bringing about immigration reform raises two important questions.
First, can (and how do) counter-attitudinal messages from elites change group members' established opinions? Although elite messages and identity activation can influence political attitudes, these identities often complement a pre-existing political identity. We know little about the effect of group cues when they run counter to most group members' existing attitudes. I use three types of data to show that: while born-again Christians are not persuaded by any pro-immigration message, the EIT's religious message influenced attitudes; the source of immigration message matters to evangelical voters; and evangelical Republicans' immigration attitudes diverged from other Republicans over time, with evangelical Republicans becoming more supportive of immigration reform while non-evangelical Republicans became less so.
The EIT's ultimate aim, to mobilize its members under the banner of progressive immigration reform, raises a second question: can elites' influence extend beyond changing opinions to also begin changing behaviors? I find that pro-reform attitude shifts do not increase evangelicals' willingness to act in support of reform. I also find that exposure to counter-attitudinal messages demobilizes reform opponents even when their attitudes do not change. Taken together, the EIT's strength lies in its ability to demobilize opponents rather than mobilize supporters. In the next sections, I provide background on evangelical Protestants' involvement with immigration reform and lay out the current state of the literature.
Evangelicals and immigration

When Matthew Soerens and Jennifer Hwang Yang began writing a book in 2007 calling on
Christians to support compassionate immigration reform, they knew they were facing an uphill battle. The book's intended audience-white evangelical Christians-was strongly op-posed to immigration reform and many evangelical groups, such as the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) which has a membership of 45,000 congregations from 40 denominations, had remained silent while President Bush tried to push through immigration reform in 2006 and 2007 (Jordan 2013; Rubin 2013; Soerens 2014 Starting in February 2013, the EIT began trying both to influence elected officials' and evangelicals' immigration opinions. One example is the EIT's "40 day challenge"-a nationwide campaign to encourage pastors and congregants to study one biblical passage on immigration per day for 40 days. The EIT has also hosted grassroots "Pray4Reform" events (Woodruff 2013) and purchased hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of billboard, radio, and website advertisements to reach evangelical Christians throughout the country. If it is to succeed, the EIT must change mass-level immigration attitudes; however, scholars know little about whether their appeals, which are based on religious-group membership but run counter to the group's existing political inclinations, can transform attitudes.
Activating identities through group cues
Identities may shape public opinion when a person sees how her identity relates to a political candidate, party, or policy issue (Campbell et al. 1960) . Elites help create a linkage between an identity and an opinion by disseminating information, framing the debate in the media, and serving as a group representative (Hogg and Reid 2006; Lee 2002; Zaller 1992 ) to a generally uninformed electorate (Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) looking to form political judgments without much cognitive effort (Miller, Wlezien and Hildreth 1991; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) . Much of the literature on identity activation, group cues, and the political cohesion of social groups, however, does not consider the possibility of competing identities (for an exception, see Klar (2013) ).
What happens when the group leadership proposes a policy position that stands in opposition to an existing opinion and another identity? The EIT's aim is not to shore up evangelicals' current opinions on immigration reform but to transform the religious group least supportive of liberal immigration reform (Jones et al. 2014 ) and more supportive of a deportation policy than the general public (Djupe 2013 ) into champions of immigration reform. This poses a challenge for the EIT as individuals reject dissonant information (Zaller 1992) and interpret new information in a biased fashion in order to reach their desired conclusion (Kunda 1990) . Moreover, many white evangelical Christians are also Republicans. These people therefore hold immigration attitudes consistent with their partisanship; another strong and stable identity that influences political preferences and behaviors (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) . The EIT has created a misalignment between many white evangelicals' religious and political identities, and the EIT's success rests on the ability of religious cues to overwhelm any partisan influence.
The religion and politics literature offers little insight into how evangelical Christians should respond to the EIT because the effects of religious messaging on public opinion are still relatively unknown. For example, consider abortion politics in the United States.
Though there are strong correlations between being an evangelical Christian, a Republican, and pro-life, researchers do not know exactly what exactly makes these correlations so strong.
We do not know whether evangelicals' pro-life attitudes develop on account of their deep commitment to a religious tradition and its corresponding beliefs (Guth et al. 2006; Kellstedt et al. 1996) or because of channeled communications through religious organizations (Djupe and Calfano 2013) . Moreover, scholars do not know if evangelical abortion attitudes become stronger through political reinforcement by Republican elites who also take vocal pro-life positions. Together, researchers are left wondering how the relationship came to be and whether religious elites, themselves, actually had any influence.
Researchers have faced difficulty isolating the effect of religious messages on attitudes, in part, because religious and political attitudes often move in concert. Adkins et al. (2013) do not find evidence of religious cues influencing evangelicals' attitudes on cultural policies, such as homosexual rights. Similarly, Robinson (2010) shows that messages from evangelical leaders in favor of capital punishment and stricter immigration policy do not influence evangelical Protestants' levels of political tolerance. From these studies, it remains unclear whether religious cues fail to shape opinions or that religious cues exerted an influence prior to the experiments.
Other studies that have tried to measure whether religious leaders can effectively change attitudes have produced qualified results. While overtly political cues from religious elites are generally ineffective (Djupe and Gilbert 2009) , elites can influence attitudes by priming a particular value (Djupe and Calfano 2013) , when a political position comes with a specific religious justification (Djupe and Gwiasda 2010) , and when there is vocal consensus among religious leaders (Campbell and Monson 2003) . These studies highlight that although religious messages can influence opinions, religious messages do not have a direct and unmitigated effect on attitudes, even among the most highly devout.
In particular, there have been few studies that directly explore the linkage between religion and immigration attitudes. Knoll (2009) and Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005) Although this research is among the first to look at environmental influences affecting immigration attitudes, it leaves much unresolved. Most notably, these works rely on single cross-sectional data sources. First, this raises the concern of self-selection, as people may choose a church or to attend services more frequently on account of their pre-existing attitudes. Second, when looking at church attendance's correlation with immigration attitudes, it is impossible to attribute the correlation to religious leaders' actions and not to another influence, such as other congregation members or individual-level religious values.
Third, self-reported measures of exposure are unreliable, particularly within houses of worship. Djupe and Gilbert (2009) find a low correlation between clergy's reported sermons and congregants' recollection of sermons. This discrepancy likely occurs because people more readily remember messages that agree with their pre-existing beliefs (Nickerson 1998) . Selfreported exposure, therefore, captures both the clergy's influence on attitudes in addition to congregants' tendency to remember sermons that match their own beliefs. Together, there is still a great deal to learn about religious elites' influence on opinion in general and influence on immigration opinion in particular.
Moreover, while all of the work on religion and immigration has focused on attitudes, the EIT wants to go beyond changing opinions: The organization wants evangelical Christians to act. Research on cross-pressured voters highlights the difficulties the EIT likely faces. Early voting studies found that individuals who face conflicting pressures, coming from identities such as partisanship, religion, class, and social status, are less likely to vote, more likely to delay in making a decision about candidate to support, and generally be less politically involved (Campbell et al. 1960; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) . Social interactionsa primary way to activate a group identity-that include political disagreement also result in lower levels of political participation (Mutz 2006; . Although hearing the other side of an argument can legitimize an opposing viewpoint, the mixed messages prove detrimental for political engagement by increasing ambivalence about the attitude object (Lavine 2001) or by wanting to avoid interpersonal conflict (Mutz 2006; . Djupe and Gilbert (2009) 
Can the EIT message marshal supporters?
In this section I describe and present the results from a survey experiment designed to test if and how the EIT's radio advertisements-different versions of which ran in 20 states-would affect potential listeners. The 1,000 person experiment ran from March 7 -14, 2014 using a national sample recruited through Survey Sampling International (SSI).
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Respondents were told that the study was interested in how individuals react to political advertisements. All respondents first watched a video advertisement for a fictitious Congressman running for re-election, which did not mention immigration reform, and provided their impressions of the politician. Respondents were then randomized into one of three conditions. Respondents in the religious advertisement condition listened to the EIT radio advertisement that aired in Colorado. In the unedited advertisement, two pastors asked listeners to join a movement of Christians that support immigration solutions rooted in biblical values. After listing the EIT's goals for immigration reform-including a pathway to citizenship-the advertisement asked listeners to pray for their elected officials and tell their representatives that they support immigration reform. Respondents in a second, secular, treatment condition listened to an edited version of the EIT advertisement. Here, the religious language was stripped away and respondents only heard the pro-immigration reform message. By separating the religious component from the immigration message itself, I isolate the religious appeals' effects. The advertisement text is available in the Appendix.
Finally, respondents in the control condition watched the congressional re-election advertise-1 SSI recruits participants through various online communities, social networks, and website ads. SSI makes efforts to recruit hard-to-reach groups, such as ethnic minorities and seniors. I did not employ quotas but asked SSI to recruit a target population that matched the (18 and over) census population on education, gender, age, geography, and income. The resulting sample is not a probability sample but is a diverse national sample. Numerous studies using SSI sample have been published in political science (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014; Kam 2012; Malhotra and Margalit 2010) . I am particularly interested in how white born-again Christians respond to the radio ad, as they represent the core group the EIT is attempting to persuade. I identify these individuals with a question asking white self-identified Christians if they consider themselves to be "born again" or not. In contrast to non-white born-again Christians who strongly support reform, their white counterparts are generally more opposed. zero at conventional levels and substantively smaller than the effects found for born-again
Christians. I also find no evidence that the radio advertisement stripped of religious language persuaded listeners (difference = -3.11, p-value = 0.48). In a direct comparison of the two treatment conditions, the religious radio ad resulted in slightly more support for immigration reform relative to the secular radio ad (difference = 7.79, p-value = 0.09). Considering both panels together, the EIT's message successfully changed immigration attitudes among born agains-the EIT's intended audience-while doing little to others' viewpoints. Table 2 To what are evangelicals responding?
I explore relative strength of the EIT and individual religious leaders by testing how evangelicals respond to e-mails that use either the Evangelical Immigration Table or an individual as the sender. Pursuant in their goals to mobilize evangelical Christians, the EIT commissioned an independent political firm to send out six e-mails about immigration reform to evangelical
Christians around the country. 4 To maximize its reach, each of the six main e-mails was first piloted with between six and eight subject lines. The subject line that produced the highest rate of opened e-mails became the subject line used in the full campaign, with e-mails going out to approximately 9 million people around the country.
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Importantly, the sender of the e-mails was also randomized in the pilot phase. For example, in the first e-mail test the subject line "What does the Bible say about immigration reform?" was sent to two groups of people. Half of the people who received this subject line had the Evangelical Immigration Table as also sent e-mails. I test whether evangelicals were more responsive-measured by opening the e-mail-to a message from the EIT or from these two types of individuals.
In total, 47 pairs of e-mail subject lines were piloted over the course of the campaign, with each subject line randomly sent by either the EIT or an individual. Each subject line, therefore, represents an experiment that allows me to test whether these different cues affect an individuals' willingness to open an e-mail about immigration reform. Open rates for the EIT's campaign varied between 0.6% to 3.1% with an average of approximately 1.6%. send the e-mail, not the EIT. Consequently, none of the six e-mails sent out on behalf of the EIT and in support of the EIT and its policies used the EIT as the e-mail sender.
Formal tests, presented in Table ? The third column breaks out the individual sender into religious versus secular individuals, categorized by whether the sender had "reverend" as part of his title. This second specification produces two interesting results. First, e-mails from a nonreligious sender still resulted in a half a percentage point increase in opened e-mails relative to e-mails from the EIT (difference = 0.54, p-value < 0.01). These e-mail recipients-despite being religious and likely to respond to evangelical messages-were more likely to act based on an e-mail from a random, religiously unaffiliated person over the EIT. 
Have immigration attitudes changed over time?
The third empirical strategy takes a step back from exploring the causal process through which cues might influence attitudes and tests whether evangelicals' immigration attitudes have actually changed over time. I do so using three-wave nationally representative panel data collected by The American Panel Study (TAPS) at Washington University in St. Louis.
TAPS uses a nationally representative sample of 2,000 adults in the United States. 8 Respondents were recruited by and the surveys were conducted through Knowledge Networks. In addition to capturing attitudes on immigration reform, the survey collects religious and 7 One concern related to the direct comparison of religious and non-religious senders is that the six piloted studies occurred at different time periods and no individual data collection effort includes both a religious and non-religious individual sender. The differences found between the groups, therefore, may be a function of when the e-mails went sent or the subject lines of a particular pilot test. If the timing of the e-mails or the specific subject
lines affected the open rates, I should find evidence of this when looking at those who received an e-mail from the EIT as well. I find no evidence that open rates varied across the piloted studies. Among those who received an e-mail from the EIT, 1.30% opened the e-mail when the alternative was a non-religious individual while 1.36% opened the e-mail when the alternative was a religious individual (difference = 0.06%, p-value = 0.65). I present and describe analyses using the full sample of respondents in the Appendix.
The main measure of immigration reform support is again a question asking whether individuals without legal documents should be allowed to remain in the country legally.
The only wording change from the experimental version of the question is the addition of a "neither support nor oppose" response option. In the results that follow, I categorize respondents' religious identification using Steensland et al.'s (2000) religious denominational coding scheme to classify evangelical respondents. All results are weighted using a dynamic weighting scheme. Although the TAPS study is designed to be nationally representative, panel but then declined to 25% between waves 2 and 3, while opposition rates rose from 51% in wave 1 to 57% in wave 3 (right panel). As non-evangelical Republicans decreased support for immigration reform, their white evangelical counterparts became more supportive.
I build on the graphical results using parametric tests, presented in Table ? ?. Here, the dependent variable is the five-point measure of immigration reform support, ranging from 0 (strong opposition) to 100 (strong support). Each row of data represents an individual in a particular wave, the coefficients are from ordinary least squares (OLS) models, and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 9 In particular, I am interested in how white evangelicals' attitudes changed relative to Republicans who are not white evangelicals. More specifically, I estimate the following model: Column 1 presents a parsimonious model without control variables, the first three rows of which show the mean difference in immigration attitudes for white evangelical Republicans compared to Republicans who are not evangelicals for each survey wave. The initial attitude gap between evangelicals and non-evangelicals is roughly -6 points. The statistically in-significant result demonstrates that Republicans-evangelical and non-evangelical alike-held similar views on immigration in Wave 1 of the survey. And to the extent that there is a difference across the groups, the results trend in evangelical Republicans taking a more conservative (i.e. more opposition) position on reform. The size of the gap, however, shrinks over time. The -6 difference in wave 1 is a +8-point difference 12 months later in wave 3. I present the interactions from the model specified above in the subsequent two rows.
Between waves 1 and 2, white evangelical Republicans became slightly more supportive of immigration reform compared to non-evangelical Republicans (β 4 = 4, se = 4), but these results do not reach statistical significance. Between waves 1 and 3, however, the change in immigration attitudes is more noticeable between the two groups (β 5 = 14, se = 5). By wave 3, a 14-point gap-representing more than one-half the distance between two response options-emerged between white evangelical and non-evangelical Republicans.
Of course, white evangelicals differ from other Republicans on a host of characteristics, and these differences could impact the estimated relationship between religious identification and immigration views. To address this possibility, models 2-5 include individual-level characteristics and opinions that may change immigration attitudes over time. Column 2 includes demographic variables of gender, race, age, age-squared, education, income, and whether the respondent lives in a border state. Column 3 includes respondents' perceptions about their personal financial situation and the financial situation of the country as a whole.
To account for feelings toward groups frequently linked with immigration, column 4 includes feeling thermometer scores toward Hispanics and Asians. And finally, column 5 includes political ideology. Each control variable is interacted with the wave variables to allow its effect to vary over time. All control variables were measured prior to the first wave of the immigration study. 10 The inclusion of control variables does not change the results from 10 As a further robustness check, I classified all respondents that are part of the "not white evangelical" category based on their religious faith and re-ran the analyses dropping individual faiths from the sample. I did this to ensure that one religious group does not the parsimonious model in column 1. In each specification, white evangelical Republicans became more supportive of immigration reform over time compared to their non-evangelical counterparts. White evangelicals' attitudes diverged from the rest of the Republican population, with the former becoming more supportive while the latter simultaneously became more opposed.
Do attitudes translate into actions?
Both the survey experiment and panel data show that evangelical Christians' religious identities are open to activation, even in the face of a competing partisan identity. But do these attitudinal shifts correspond to an increased willing to act? In the survey experiment, I
answer this question using a quasi-behavioral measure asking respondents whether or not they would be willing to sign a petition sharing their immigration views with their member of Congress. I find the strong 20-point change in reported attitudes does not carry over into action. While 22% of white born-again Christians in the control condition were willing to sign a petition in favor of a pathway to citizenship, 26% of their counterparts hearing EIT's message-including the religious rhetoric-were willing to do so. This 4% shift is both substantively small and statistically insignificant (se = 0.08, p-value = 0.61). The EIT's counter-attitudinal message influenced reported attitudes on a survey, but the message did not affect respondents' willingness to act on behalf of the immigration cause.
Conversely, the EIT's message demobilized those born-again Christians holding the most conservative immigration opinions. Whereas the secular pro-immigration advertisement actually energized pro-deportation respondents, increasing the likelihood of a respondent signing a petition to nearly 50%, the EIT's message decreased the likelihood to 30% (difference = drive the comparison between white evangelicals and the rest of the population. Dropping each subgroup within the "non-evangelical" category produces substantively and statistically similar results. Table ? ? displays the predicted probabilities for an evangelical reform supporter. A supporter had only a 0.15 probability of acting on her views in wave 1. This probability increases to 0.24 in wave 2. This 0.09 change is substantively meaningful despite not being significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.17).
The mobilization around immigration reform, however, stalls. By wave 3, the probability that a supporter's immigration views would influence her vote dropped to 0.21, a probability that is statistically indistinguishable from wave 1 levels (p-value = 0.48).
These null results are particularly striking given that a self-reported measure of vote 
Discussion and conclusion
A great deal of research has looked at how group cues can make social identities politically relevant, but we know little about what happens when a group cue runs counter to another identity or pre-existing opinion. The EIT taking on a prophetic role, espousing a religious truth about immigration reform, provides the opportunity to study the reaches and limits of social group influence.
I began with an experiment testing how the EIT's message affected different religious groups. While born-again Christians were not responsive to a secular pro-reform message, the EIT radio advertisement resonated with group members. These results comport with Djupe and Gwiasda (2010) who find that evangelicals respond to environmental appeals when the appeal includes both a religious identity cue and a decision-making process cue in which the religious leader describes how he reached his stated position. The field experiment further shows that the EIT itself is not operating as a strong group cue; rather, it is individual religious leaders who are more likely shaping evangelicals' attitudes. Importantly, the pastors (in the radio advertisement) and reverends (in the e-mail campaigns) are not known quantities to many evangelicals. Evangelicals are therefore responding to religious leaders, identified only by their title. Together, these results show how group leaders can overcome the commonly noted barriers to persuasion, even when presenting dissonant information.
The experimental results also show that religious political campaigns do not necessarily produce a backlash effect among more secular citizens. Bolce and De Maio (2008; 1999) find that the growth of "anti-fundamentalist" sentiment in the U.S. is linked to evangelical involvement in politics. Adkins et al. (2013) is larger when the identity is perceived to be under threat. This result is consistent with social identity theorists who note that "...shared interests (perceived or actual) and related grievances play a role in producing political cohesion..." (Huddy 2003) . It is therefore possible that group cues that threaten a particular identity are strong enough to not only change opinions but also encourage group members to act on these opinions. Second, when can group leaders influence opinion by the nature of their role as community leaders and when do leaders need to justify their position to their community before successfully shaping attitudes? By separating source cues from effective messaging, scholars will gain a better understanding of how people use group cues as a simple way to develop complex policy opinions.
The results from this paper along with avenues for future research address important, yet unexplored, questions related to identities, group influence, opinion change, and participation. Immigration reform is one policy domain that cuts across traditional partisan lines and has created unlikely bedfellows. More generally, when elites change their position or new issues emerge on the scene, group members must decide whether to update their views or hold onto their previously held stances. The findings from this paper provide insight into whether, how, and to what extent these group cues can influence group members' attitudes and prospects of mobilization. Notes: The dependent variable is a four-point measure of immigration reform support ranging from strongly oppose (0) to strongly support (100). The coefficients are OLS estimates. The intercept represents the average immigration support for respondents in the control condition. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns 1 and 2 replicate the results from Figure ? ? using the four-point scale, while columns 3, 4, and 5 extend the analysis to additional religious categories. * = p<0.1 ** = p<0.05 Note: The graphs plot immigration attitudes over time along with a line of best fit between each wave. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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